No. 04-859
IN THE
United States Supreme Court
RALPH H. SPEKEN, M.D. and STEPHANIE Z. SPEKEN, M.S.
Petitioners
V.
THOMAS R. MOORE, ESQ.
Respondent
On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari
To The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
First Judicial Department
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
EVAN H. KRINICK
RIVKIN RADLER LLP
Attorneys for Respondent
EAB Plaza
Uniondale, NY 11556-0111
(516) 357-3000
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………………………. ii
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL
BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2
A. The Underlying Action…………………………………………………………………………………….. 2
B. The Instant Action…………………………………………………………………………………………… 8
ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE DENIED…………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 16
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bartkowski v. Friedman, 213 A.D.2d 873,
623 N.Y.S.2d 946 (3d Dep’t 1995)…………………………………………………………………………. 14
Black v. White & Case, 280 A.D.2d 407, 721
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1st Dep’t), appeal denied, 96
N.Y.2d 714, 729 N.Y.S.2d 442 (2001)…………………………………………………………………….. 14, 15
Conte v. City of New York, 294 A.D.2d 109, 741
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1st Dep’t 2002)……………………………………………………………………………… 13
Jung v. Gemmette, 249 A.D.2d 827, 671 N.Y.S.2d
862 (3d Dep’t), appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 807,
678 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1998)……………………………………………………………………………………… 14, 15
Kirsh v. City of New York, 2 A.D.3d 353, 768
N.Y.S.2d 819 (1st Dep’t 2003)…………………………………………………………………………….. 13
Rubens v. Tintle, 258 A.D.2d 385, 683 N.Y.S.2d
854 (1st Dep’t 1999)………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13
Schwarz v. Shapiro, 202 A.D.2d 187, 608 N.Y.S.2d
210 (1st Dep’t), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 760,
616N.Y.S.2d15(1994)…………………………………………………………………………………………. 14
Sei Young Choi v. Dworkin, 230 A.D.2d 780, 646
N.Y.S.2d 531 (2d Dep’t), appeal denied, 89
N.Y.2d 805, 658 N.Y.S.2d918 (1996)…………………………………………………………………… 13, 14,15
iii
Cited Authorities
Speken v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,
278 A.D.2d 154, 717 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1st Dep’t
2000)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7
Speken v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,
304 A.D.2d 489, 759 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1st Dep’t),
lv. denied, 100 N.Y.2d 511, 766 N.Y.S.2d 164
(2003)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7
Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 352 N.Y.S.2d
919 (1974)…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
Statutes:
New York Civ. Prac. Law and Rules 321 1(a)(1),
(5) (7)………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 8, 13
U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10……………………………………………………………………………………….. 11, 12
INTRODUCTION
Respondent Thomas R. Moore (“Moore”) submits this
Opposition Brief to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed
by Petitioners Ralph H. Speken, M.D. and Stephanie Z.
Speken, M.S. (“Petitioners”). Petitioners claim that this Court
should review the dismissal of their New York State legal
malpractice complaint because the courts of the State of New
York refused to hear their constitutional arguments. To the
contrary, Petitioners’ arguments were heard over and over
again and the courts of the State of New York dismissed their
complaint because their claims had already been heard and
decided on numerous occasions. This petition presents
nothing more than another attempt by Petitioners to continue
their meritless action after the courts of the State of New
York have continually dismissed their lawsuits.
In short, in this legal malpractice action, Petitioners
alleged that Moore, who represented them in an
underlying medical malpractice/wrongful death action,
coerced Petitioners into settling the case. The issue of the
voluntariness of the settlement, however, had already been
litigated twice and, the instant action, which sought to raise
those same issues, was properly dismissed. On this petition
for a writ of certiorari, Petitioners merely rehash their
argument raised at the New York State Courts and re-label it
as an alleged constitutional violation and have otherwise
failed to demonstrate how the issue warrants review by this
Court. Accordingly, for the reasons that will be discussed
more fully below, the instant petition for a writ of certiorari
should be denied.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action for, inter a/ia, legal malpractice against
Moore arises out of Moore’s representation of Petitioners in
connection with an underlying medical malpractice/wrongful
death action against Columbia Presbyterian Hospital (the
“Hospital”) on behalf of their deceased son, Seth Speken.
After Petitioners agreed to settle the medical malpractice
action, they subsequently moved to vacate the settlement
premised on allegations that the settlement was the product
of fraud because Moore coerced them into settlement. After
hearing Petitioners’ challenges to the settlement, their motion
was denied. Petitioners then commenced a second action
against the Hospital, which was also denied. Thereafter,
Petitioners commenced the instant legal malpractice action
against Moore premised on the same allegations of fraud and
coercion that had already been heard and decided. The legal
malpractice action was dismissed, the dismissal was affirmed
on appeal and the New York State Court of Appeals denied
Petitioners’ application for leave to appeal. Petitioners now
seek a writ of certiorari.
A. The UnderlyingAction
As alleged in the underlying wrongful death/medical
malpractice complaint, the Hospital was negligent in its care
and treatment of Seth Speken, Petitioners’ son, resulting in
his death on August 27, 1993. Seth Speken was admitted to
the Hospital on August 21, 1993 as a psychiatric patient
following a seizure episode. He suffered from Crohn’s
disease, panic attacks and depression. Petitioner Ralph
Speken, Seth Speken’s father and a medical doctor, also
treated his son’s panic disorders. While at the Hospital, Seth
3
Speken allegedly became delusional and was placed in wrist
and ankle restraints. He subsequently developed an embolism
that caused his death.
Thereafter, Petitioners retained Moore to commence a
wrongful death action against the Hospital and, on or about
October 11, 1994, an action was commenced. The Hospital
counterclaimed, seeking indemnification and/or contribution,
alleging that it was Ralph Speken’s own negligence in the
treatment of his son that ultimately caused his son’s death.
At some point, Petitioners created and began operating
a website located at www. med-malpractice. corn, titled “A
Death in the Hospital.” The website recounts Petitioners’
version of the facts and allegations of malpractice against
the Hospital, its personnel, physicians and nurses involved
in Seth Speken’s treatment.
After five years of litigation, the underlying action
reached settlement. On July 8, 1999, Petitioners and the
Hospital executed a settlement, the terms of which were
incorporated into a General Release. In addition, the terms
of the settlement were transcribed and Petitioners, on the
record in open court, advised that they understood the terms
of the settlement, that the settlement was voluntary and that
it was not coerced. The settlement included the payment of
$500,000 by the Hospital, complete confidentiality and the
exchange of mutual releases. In addition, the settlement also
required Petitioners to dismantle their website and refrain
from creating any similar websites. In particular, the General
Release provided that:
The Releasors agree that they shall immediately
and permanently expunge their website located at
4
www. med-ma/practice. corn and shall not reissue,
open or create another Internet accessible site or
website concerning the allegations in this lawsuit,
the personnel, physicians, nurses and hospital
involved and/or the medical care and treatment
rendered to the decedent by the defendant and its
medical staff.
(35a).1 In addition, in open court, Petitioners both agreed
that they voluntarily entered into the settlement (31a-32a).
Despite the foregoing, by notice of motion dated October
24, 1999, Petitioners moved to vacate the settlement,
maintaining that the settlement was procured by fraud.
Petitioners apparently had second thoughts about agreeing
to confidentiality and dismantling their website and claimed
that Moore coerced them into entering into the settlement.
By decision and order dated March 31, 2000, Supreme
Court, New York County (Heitler, J.) fully explored
Petitioners’ allegations of fraud and denied their motion to
vacate the settlement (13a-38a). The court specifically noted
that the stipulation of settlement was preceded by the in-
person testimony of both Petitioners, who each agreed to the
terms of the settlement under oath. The court also noted that
both Petitioners executed the General Release, which
specifically incorporated the terms of the settlement. The
court explicitly found that the settlement was not the product
of fraud, duress or coercion. Specifically, the New York State
trial court held that:
[A] review of the record discloses no competent
evidence of fraud, duress or other cause sufficient
____________________
1. Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages in the Appendix to
the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
5
to invalidate this settlement…. Rather, it is clear
that, at the time that the stipulation was made,
Petitioners were represented by counsel, knowingly
and voluntarily entered into the stipulation in open
court, and indicated that they were satisfied with the
agreement and that their judgment was not impaired
that day.
(30a). The New York State trial court further emphasized that
Petitioners could not prove any of their allegations of fraud. In
particular, the court noted that:
[Petitioners] admit that they have no direct proof
that Moore, or anyone else, coerced them into
signing the General Release..
Moreover, it is clear that [Petitioners] were
intimately involved in the settlement process, and
were represented at all times by an attorney of their
own choosing. These circumstances do not constitute
coercion or duress…. [Petitioners], who are both
educated and sophisticated individuals, personally
attended and participated in virtually all of the eight
settlement conferences held by this Court….
In addition, [Petitioners] clearly and unequivocally
testified in open court that their decision to settle
the case was made of their own free will, and that
they were not forced to do so by anyone. It is thus
clear that Petitioners’ decision to settle this case was
their own, and not Moore’s….
Although [Petitioners] also contend that their fear
that trial would begin immediately spurred them to
6
sign the General Release, a court’s direction that the
parties proceed to trial does not constitute coercion
or duress, since courts have inherent power to
control their calendars and the disposition of court
business.
[Petitioners] further allege that the deceptive.
actions of Moore, designed for his own financial
gain, constitute fraud. [Petitioners’] claim of
fraud, however, is insufficient for vacatur of this
settlement. …
(32a-33a).
The New York State trial court continued, finding that
Petitioners did not establish coercion on the part of Moore
and also finding that the explicit language of the General
Release refuted any claim that Petitioners were coerced into
agreeing to dismantling their website. The court found that:
[Petitioners] have not established that their
agreement to settle this case was procured by fraud
or coercion. If Moore had threatened to resign if
they did not accept the settlement, that would not
have trapped [Petitioners] into accepting an
unwanted settlement. Said information should
have been put before the court when a record was
being made re the settlement. [Petitioners] were
under oath and had the opportunity and obligation
to advise the court at that time that they did
not want to settle and/or that they were under
duress…
7
[Petitioners] also contend that they would never
have agreed to refrain from “talking about what
the [Hospital had done” had their will not been
“overcome” … However, the clear wording of
the General Release, which both [Petitioners]
signed, and which both [Petitioners] testified that
they had no questions about, clearly prevented
them from publishing or continuing to publish
their version of the Hospital’s deficiencies in its
treatment of Seth Speken on their website.
(34a-35a).
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department
affirmed the denial of Petitioners’ motion to vacate the
settlement. See Speken v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical
Center, 278 A.D.2d 154, 717 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1st Dep’t 2000).
Petitioners thereafter commenced a second action against
the Hospital, seeking to relitigate the validity of the settlement
agreement. The Hospital moved to dismiss the second action
and, by order dated March 8, 2002, Supreme Court, New
York County (Bransten, J.), granted the Hospital’s motion to
dismiss, specifically finding that Petitioners had an
opportunity to filly litigate the validity of the settlement
agreement. The Appellate Division, First Department again
rejected Petitioners’ arguments and the New York Court of
Appeals denied Petitioners’ application for leave to appeal.
See Speken v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 304
A.D.2d 489, 759 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1’s Dep’t), lv. denied, 100
N.Y.2d 511, 766 N.Y.S.2d 164 (2003).
8
B. The Instant Action
Petitioners thereafter commenced the instant legal
malpractice action against Moore and, despite the fact that
the issue of the settlement had already been litigated twice,
Petitioners alleged that Moore coerced them into settling the
underlying action. By notice of motion dated August 2, 2002,
Moore moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (1), (5) and (7) to
dismiss the complaint, maintaining that Petitioners, who had
twice asserted similar claims regarding the settlement
agreement, should be collaterally estopped from bringing an
action against Moore based on the same allegations.
By decision and order dated April 15, 2003, Supreme
Court, New York County (Tolub, 1.), granted Moore’s motion
and dismissed Petitioners’ complaint (7a-12a). After
reviewing the factual and procedural history of the case, the
New York State trial court determined that Petitioners’ claims
are barred. In particular, the court held that:
The gravamen of [Petitioners’] Complaint
involves claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, negligence and legal
malpractice. Although [Petitioners] contend that
the instant complaint is not barred by the doctrine
of res judicata, the allegations contained within
the Complaint, most notably within the first and
second causes of action, admittedly arise directly
from the settlement of the original malpractice
action. Consequently, all of [Petitioners’] claims
made in the instant matter have either already been
litigated or could have been litigated in the actions
brought before Justice Heitler and Justice
9
Bransten. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata
bars further claims on these issues.
(9a).
In addition, the New York State trial court found that
Moore, who was hired to represent Petitioners in connection
with an action against the Hospital, performed his duties.
In particular, the court held that:
[Petitioners] hired [Moore] to represent them in
connection with the original malpractice action
against the Hospital. [Moore] prepared the case
for trial, obtained additional trial counsel, and
when trial counsel withdrew, obtained new trial
counsel. [Moore] then facilitated settlement
negotiations and succeeded in obtaining a
$500,000 settlement in favor of the [Petitioners]
conditioned on the dismantling of [Petitioners’]
website. The primary goal of [Moore’s]
engagement was to represent [Petitioners’] action
and in a best case scenario, obtain a judgment in
favor of the [Petitioners]. This, in fact, was
accomplished when a settlement agreement was
reached. That [Petitioners] have not been able to
collect the settlement amount due to their own
failure to comply with the terms of the settlement
agreement is not evidence of either legal
malpractice or breach of contract on the part of
defendant. Accordingly, as [Petitioners] have not
made the requisite showing indicating either
negligence or breach of contract, [Petitioners’]
third cause of action is dismissed
10
On appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department,
Petitioners argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did
not bar the instant action because the issues of Moore’s alleged
fraud surrounding the procurement of the settlement agreement
that had been earlier decided in the underlying action were
‘gratuitous” findings to those proceedings. Moore argued that
the issues surrounding the settlement agreement, including the
issues regarding Moore’s role in procuring the settlement, were
fully explored in the underlying action and, in particular, the
issues surrounding the allegations that Moore coerced Petitioners
into settlement were fundamental to the court’s conclusion to
not vacate the settlement in the underlying action.
By decision and order dated April 6, 2004, the Appellate
Division, First Department, unanimously rejected Petitioners’
arguments (3a-4a). In its order, the First Department rejected
Petitioners’ argument, specifically noting that the arguments
raised by Petitioners were the same arguments that they had
raised in previous litigations. The court held that:
The underlying action was for wrongful death based
on medical malpractice, and was settled just before
trial. Two attempts by [Petitioners] to vacate the
settlement were denied, the second on the ground
that it was precluded by the denial of the first.
The instant action, which claims that the settlement
was a product of [Petitioners’] attorney’s
malpractice, fraud and disloyalty, must be dismissed
for the same reason; indeed, this precise claim was
made and necessarily rejected in [Petitioners’] first
attempt to vacate the settlement….
Petitioners then sought leave to appeal to the New York State
Court of Appeals. By order dated September 21, 2004, the New
York State Court of Appeals denied Petitioners’ application
(la-2a). Petitioners now petition for a writ of certiorari.
11
ARGUMENT
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED
As provided by this Court’s rules, a petition for a writ of
certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. While
not exclusive, the following factors are relevant to this
Court’s consideration of whether to grant review on a writ
of certiorari:
(a) a United Sates court of appeals has entered a
decision in conflict with the decision of another
United States court of appeals on the same
important matter; has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with a decision
by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts
with the decision of another state court of last
resort or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals
has decided an important question of federal law
that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court, or has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court.
Sup. Ct. R. 10.
12
In the first instance, absent from the petition, is a
reference to any of the applicable factors. Petitioners wholly
fail to identify a federal question that the courts of the State
of New York decided, how such a decision conflicted with
either a decision of another state court of last resort or of a
United States court of appeals, or otherwise decided an
important question of federal law that should be settled by
this Court.
Instead, Petitioners identify an issue that is unique only
to them and revisit legal issues that have been firmly
established by well settled New York jurisprudence. Rather
than present arguments that fall within this Court’s criteria
for granting a writ of certiorari, Petitioners complain that
the courts of the State of New York have made erroneous
factual findings or misapplied a properly stated rule of law
— grounds upon which this Court rarely grants a petition
for a writ of certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 10.
Couched within broad challenges to their due process
rights, Petitioners complain that they were never given an
opportunity to be heard. The record, however, demonstrates
that Petitioners, time and again, by commencing legal action
after legal action, had several opportunities to be heard. That
the courts of the State of New York dismissed their complaints
by motion practice did not in any way, shape or form deprive
Petitioners of their opportunity to be heard.
In fact, Petitioners’ main point of dispute, that Moore
allegedly coerced them into executing the General Release,
had been fully heard and decided (13a-38a). As part of the
underlying medical malpractice action, Petitioners attempted
to vacate the settlement based on notions of fraud and
coercion by their attorney. The New York State trial court, in
13
the underlying medical malpractice action, squarely
addressed that issue and found that Petitioners “clearly
‘acquiesced in, consented to, and [are] bound by the
settlement”’ (37a).
Because the issue of Moore’s alleged coercion had been
fully and fairly litigated, Petitioners’ legal malpractice action,
premised on these same allegations, was properly dismissed
based on principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Pursuant to New York’s rules of civil procedure, a cause of
action may be dismissed based on collateral estoppel and
res judicata. See, New York Civ. Prac. Law and Rules
321 1(a)(5). Where a party has had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate issues in a prior action, the complaint will be
dismissed pursuant to CPLR 321 1(a)(5) based on collateral
estoppel. See Kirsh v. City of New York, 2 A.D.3d 353, 768
N.Y.S.2d 819 (1st Dep’t 2003); Conte v. City of New York,
294 A.D.2d 109, 741 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1st Dep’t 2002); Rubens
v. Tintle, 258 A.D.2d 385, 683 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1st Dep’t 1999).
Indeed, the courts of the State of New York have
unhesitatingly dismissed complaints premised on theories of
legal malpractice where the issues raised were previously
heard and decided in prior proceedings seeking to vacate
settlements. For example, in Sei Young Choi v. Dworkin, 230
A.D.2d 780, 646 N.Y.S.2d 531 (2d Dep’t), appeal denied,
89 N.Y.2d 805, 658 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1996), the plaintiff
commenced an action to recover damages for fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty and breach of contract against his former
attorney. In the underlying divorce action, the plaintiffs
attorney negotiated a settlement of certain property issues.
Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to vacate the settlement,
maintaining that his attorney induced him to accept the
settlement. The motion to vacate was denied. Because the
14
issues regarding the attorney’s actions were raised in the
application to vacate the settlement, the court held that the
instant action was barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. In particular, the Appellate Division held that:
We agree with the Supreme Court that this action
is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The plaintiffs claims regarding his attorney’s
conduct were previously raised in his application
to vacate the stipulation of settlement in the
matrimonial action, and his application was
denied on the merits. . . Here, as in the
matrimonial action, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant, inter alia, misled him as to his options,
induced him under duress to accept the settlement,
and failed to protect his interests
Id. at 781 (citations omitted). See also Black v. White & Case,
280 A.D.2d 407, 721 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1st Dep’t), appeal denied,
96 N.Y.2d 714, 729 N.Y.S.2d 442 (2001); Sei Young Choi v.
Dworkin, 230 A.D.2d 780, 646 N.Y.S.2d 531 (2d Dep’t),
appeal denied, 89 N.Y.2d 805, 658 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1996);
Jung v. Gemmette, 249 A.D.2d 827, 671 N.Y.S.2d 862
(3d Dep’t), appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 807, 678 N.Y.S.2d 593
(1998); Bartkowski v. Friedman, 213 A.D.2d 873, 623
N.Y.S.2d 946 (3d Dep’t 1995); Schwarz v. Shapiro, 202
A.D.2d 187, 608 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep’t), appeal denied,
83 N.Y.2d 760, 616 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1994).
This case falls directly in line with New York
jurisprudence and presents no compelling reason warranting
review by this Court. Petitioners maintain, as they have
through the lengthy history of this litigation, that collateral
estoppel does not present an obstacle for consideration of
15
these issues because, according to them, the findings with
respect to issues of Moore’s alleged coercion were
“gratuitous.” In other words, Petitioners argue that the finding
that there was no evidence of fraud by Moore was extraneous
to the ultimate determination to not vacate the settlement.
Yet, Petitioners wholly ignore the fact that the central
reason why they requested vacatur of the settlement was
based on their contention that Moore coerced them into
agreeing to it. The findings by the New York State trial court,
therefore, were not “gratuitous.” Rather, the findings that
Moore did not coerce Petitioners were fundamental to the
trial court’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to vacate.
Petitioners’ suggestion that they were entitled to an
evidentiary hearing is simply incorrect. Instead, as the
examples above illustrated, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applies in circumstances similar to those present here, without
the requirement of an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Black,
280 A.D.2d 407 (collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of
issues that were decided in connection with a motion to vacate
a divorce decree); Jung, 249 A.D.2d 827 (collateral estoppel
precludes relitigation of issues that were decided in
connection with a motion for an order clarifying a stipulation
regarding maintenance obligations); Sei Young Choi, 230
A.D.2d 780 (collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of
issues that were decided in connection with a motion to vacate
a settlement). To be sure, the New York Court of Appeals
has expressly held that, “an order made upon a motion
provides such a ‘judgment’ as will bar relitigation under the
doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel so long as the
requisites of identity of issue and opportunity to contest are
present.” Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 356, 352
N.Y.S.2d 919 (1974).
16
Plainly put, this case represents a state issue that in no
way implicates a federal question and, even if a federal
question was involved, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate
how New York’s resolution of the issue conflicts with
decisions of other state courts, decisions of the United States
court of appeals, or decisions of this Court.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
EVAN H. KRINICK
RIVKIN RADLER LLP
Attorneys for Respondent
EAB Plaza
Uniondale, NY 11556-0111
(516) 357-3000